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Understanding sovereign leadership as a response to terrorism: A post-foundational 
analysis 
 
Introduction 
This study seeks to better understand how notions of sovereign power as a response to 
terrorism are built and bolstered through use of the signifier ‘leadership’ and how such 
articulations of leadership foreclose possibilities for critical engagement and dissent. Recent 
years have witnessed a growth of scholarly interest in the sovereign power of public leaders, 
particularly in how such power is manifested in their domestic and foreign responses to 
terrorist attacks. Such work has developed understanding of sovereign power as inhering in 
‘emergency’ (Honig, 2011) or ‘exceptional’ (Agamben, 1998 and 2005) acts, where the 
sovereign judgments of leaders are pre-eminent and establish an ambiguous “zone of 
indistinction” (Agamben, 1998: 19) between law and the authority of leaders, helping us to 
locate the underlying justification for acts such as torture, rendition, war and surveillance. 
Some research exists connecting the rhetoric of leaders to claims and exercises of sovereign 
power (e.g. Bligh et al, 2004; Esch, 2010; Widmaier, 2007). These can be situated within the 
broader area of critical leadership studies (CLS) (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012; Collinson, 
2011), where analysis can make visible workings of power achieved via a “particular 
authorized language” (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012: 374) of leadership. Within critical and 
empirical studies of leader rhetoric, however, the tendency is usually to assume that the 
language uttered by leaders can be claimed as valid terrain for analyses of leadership. While 
acknowledging the validity and value of these studies, particularly in making more visible the 
ways in which leader status is constituted through language, we seek to accomplish 
something different, through a post-foundational (Cederström and Spicer, 2014; Marchart, 
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2007) and ‘categorical’ (Kelly, 2008) analysis of the word ‘leadership’ and how it is put to 
use in relation to terrorism.  
Based on the above conceptual positioning, our guiding research question is as follows: ‘How 
is the signifier ‘leadership’ used to foreclose meaning concerning notions of sovereign power 
in relation to terrorism?’ Adopting a post-foundational analysis, we operate on the 
assumption that the meaning formed around the word ‘leadership’ is accomplished through 
ongoing and contingent rhetorical acts. Such an analysis approaches ‘leadership’ as a 
significant signifier, which draws out the political, affective and ethical connections made by 
the speaker (Laclau, 2015). Methodologically, we address the research question through a 
purposive sample, the speeches, writings and press conferences of former UK Prime Minister 
(PM) Tony Blair, a key figure in the US/UK-led ‘war on terror’. Blair was a noteworthy 
leader: a proponent for military action in response to the 9/11 terror attacks in the US and 
later for the invasion of Iraq, and something of an outlier in these terms amongst leaders of 
governments in Europe. Recognised for his rhetorical abilities (Fairclough, 2000), Blair’s 
numerous public statements and speeches provide a rich bank of data for better understanding 
how the case for sovereign power as a response to terrorism is accomplished in language.  
Building from our data, we theorise ‘sovereign leadership’ as the deployment of the signifier 
leadership in ways that foreclose language so as to normalise the discourse and acts of 
sovereign power. Henceforth, rather than the complicated formulation of ‘the signifier 
leadership in relation to the discourse of sovereign power’, we shall refer simply to 
‘sovereign leadership’ as a means of expressing the imbrication of leadership and sovereign 
power, except where the analysis and discussion benefits from their conceptual separation. 
Our key finding is that sovereign leadership offers a (misleadingly) straightforward solution 
through contingent rhetorical connections and positioning, foreclosing language so that 
alternative responses to the complex problem of terrorism are shut down. Within the 
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operation of sovereign leadership, we posit three foreclosing ‘moments’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 105), “differential positions” (ibid) that are drawn upon to bolster the urgency, 
affective salience and justness of this rhetorical response to terrorism: emergency, positivity 
and vulnerability.  
Our contribution lies primarily within the area of CLS, in providing an analysis of the use of 
the word leadership within rhetoric and in a situation of perceived terrorist threat, unpacking 
some of the ways in which leadership seems central to the justification of sovereign power. 
We view our study as contributing to a demystification of language (Śliwa et al, 2012), by 
laying bare the articulatory systems established to convey a sense of sovereign leadership, a 
tendency we later posit as holding broader significance for future studies of leadership. The 
value of our contribution lies in the identification of a sovereign language of leadership and a 
deeper understanding of its operation, which in its articulation seeks to foreclose possibilities 
for alternative perspectives. Leadership is a ubiquitous word in organizational and social 
parlance – so much so that in everyday use it may be difficult for consumers of the word to 
discern how it is being deployed - and offering a means of better understanding its use 
therefore holds a value beyond the analysis of what people in leader positions say. A 
secondary contribution lies in the area of post-foundational theory, offering more empirical 
depth to previously conceptualised explorations of the power of public leaders in times of 
perceived crisis. While we do not claim generalizability from our findings, we do note that as 
leadership has been acknowledged as an increasingly influential signifier in the areas of 
organization studies, political studies and public administration, our paper may act as a useful 
resource for a broad range of studies that seek to explore the ways in which leadership is 
deployed rhetorically.  
Before continuing, as this is a study relating to language use, it is important to clarify the 
post-foundational terminology employed. By discourse, we adopt the definition from Laclau 
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and Mouffe (1985: 105), that a discourse is a “structured totality resulting from [an] 
articulatory practice” and implies a degree of ‘fixation’ in meaning (Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002: 26), although, as will be explored later, a key tenet of post-foundationalism is that 
meaning is always fluid and contingent. In this study, sovereign power is approached as a 
discourse. Leadership is used in this study as a signifier of a particular ‘nodal’ and ‘empty’ 
status, meaning that it acts as a kind of anchoring and connective word that threads together 
the moments that assemble a discourse of sovereign power. The word ‘moment’ is used to 
designate “differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105). By moments in this study, we refer to notions of emergency, 
positivity, and vulnerability that are drawn upon to assemble sovereign leadership. The term 
‘rhetoric’ is used in this study to signal a system of language with a persuasive force, which 
“functions to persuade and motivate” (Finlayson, 2003: 67). 
 
Critical leadership studies and ‘categorical’ studies of leadership 
We situate this study within the area of CLS, perspectives that assume that “leaders and 
leadership dynamics…exercise significant power and influence over contemporary 
organizational and societal processes” (Collinson, 2011: 181) but that “critique the power 
relations and identity constructions through which leadership dynamics are often reproduced, 
frequently resisted and occasionally transformed” (ibid). Our approach is critical, in as much 
as we seek to examine “the patterns of power and domination associated with leadership, and 
relate it to broader ideological and institutional conditions” (ibid: 373), and “critique forms of 
power and dominance that relate to what leaders/managers do and how they do it” (Fairhurst 
and Grant, 2010: 186).  
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Our study also follows the discursive (Fairhurst, 2008) and interpretive (Alvesson and Spicer, 
2012) traditions within CLS, which consider “leadership as socially constructed through 
actors beginning to ‘see’ a set of activities as leadership” (ibid: 372). Language use is 
therefore of central importance to the study, exploring how leaders “exercise power by 
‘managing meaning’, and defining situations in ways that suit their purposes” (Collinson, 
2011: 185). This is the terrain of meaning framing (Fairhurst, 2011; Ganz, 2010), where the 
underlying assumption is that leaders seek to shape frames of interpretation to influence 
others (e.g. Auvinen et al, 2013; Spear and Roper, 2016). For example, Auvinen et al (2013) 
explore the manipulative adoption of framing by leaders. Manipulation, according to the 
researchers, is a ‘diverse phenomenon’; it can be ‘seductive’, “misrepresent[ing] reality in too 
positive a manner”, often by “exaggerating one single detail” above others (ibid: 426); it can 
also be deployed in ‘pseudo-empathetic’ ways, taking advantage of the “human capacity to 
participate emotionally in the experiences of other people” or through the pretence of 
“sharing in the feelings and emotions” of others (ibid: 427). While manipulation is not a point 
of focus for this study, as establishing intent on the part of the speaker in our data was beyond 
the scope of the research, we do see value in learning from existing work in terms of how 
leaders seek to convince an audience of a course of action using a range of rhetorical ploys.  
A major problem with leadership research is that, as leadership is a contested, if culturally 
familiar notion, “leadership researchers often do not know what they are studying” 
(Sutherland, 2016: 2). Acknowledging this problem and also wanting to be more precise than 
interpreting leadership as things leaders do and say, we turn to ‘categorical’ (Kelly, 2008) 
studies of leadership. Such studies focus on how the signifier of leadership is “actually used” 
(Smolović Jones et al, 2016: 439), seeking to avoid the projection of prior categorical 
assumptions of leadership upon data, and thus the phenomenon of “academics exercising 
power over the meaning-making of research participants” (ibid). From a categorical 
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perspective, therefore, the “very familiarity [of researchers] with the term ‘leadership’ may be 
one of the central problems of researching it” (Kelly, 2008: 764; see also Pondy, 1978). The 
focus of categorical studies is upon the specific articulations of leadership, of research 
participants’ “own methods in the practical accomplishment of leadership” (Kelly, 2008: 
769). Such an approach requires the “set[ting] aside [of] explicit theories, models and 
assumptions as to the essential character of leadership” (ibid: 770) so that the researcher may 
take account of the affective and ideological effects of the signifier. 
Categorical studies enable an analysis that brings to light the myriad associations made 
through the use of leadership in language (Pondy, 1978). In this vein, Alvesson and 
Sveningsson’s (2003a) interview study of R&D managers shows how the category of 
leadership can disappear under contradiction, or ‘break down’ (p.278) when subjected to 
closer scrutiny. Such vagueness associated with the signifier of leadership can contribute to 
the mystification and opaqueness of power, making notions of leadership less tangible and 
therefore less democratically accountable (Sutherland et al, 2014). In a related study, 
Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003b) highlight a more obvious association between the 
signifier of leadership and the power and status of people in senior positions, positing that the 
signifier is drawn upon to make otherwise mundane managerial activities seem ‘extra-
ordinary’ and that it is this act of ‘labelling’ that connotes something “significant, even 
‘magical’ being accomplished” (p.1454). These studies have yet to explicitly connect, 
however, the grand language and signifier of leadership to the discursive assembling and 
normalizing of sovereign power. One of our contentions, the implications of which will be 
returned to in the discussion, as it holds promise for future research, is that sovereign 
leadership may be a discourse that exists prior to and beyond its articulation by particular 
actors.  
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Leader rhetoric and terrorism 
Contemporary political writers have drawn attention to what they see as an extension of the 
sovereign power of public leaders in response to terrorism. Agamben (1998 and 2005) refers 
to such situations as ‘states of exception’, exceptional because they allow leaders the 
discretion to act outside normal structures of democratic accountability, to make legally and 
ethically ambiguous decisions concerning the life of certain groups of people.  
This notion of sovereign power within a context of exception has informed studies of the 
language of leaders. These studies demonstrate how leaders, through their rhetoric, seek to 
engender support for exception and, when achieved, to normalise the exception (Crockett, 
2003; Winkler, 2007). Esch (2010), writing in a US context, illustrates how presidents tend to 
draw on surreptitious myths, “invisible” in his terminology (p.360), to frame a certain view of 
nation that makes military action seem like a ‘civilized’ (p.358) act. Framing is an important 
word here, and seems closely connected to sovereign power, in as much as acts of framing by 
leaders in response to terrorist attacks, can be interpreted as “claim[ing] the right to define 
the…moment of exception” (Maggio, 2007: 818), definitions that often single out ‘enemies’ 
against whom the leader proposes a military response (ibid), and which can come packaged 
in ‘savage’ terms (Ivie, 1980). Hence leaders may commit a “strategic misrepresentation”, 
bolstered by “exaggeration or fabrication” in order to adhere to the familiar tropes of the war 
rhetoric genre (Winkler, 2007: 312).     
War rhetoric is usually saturated with the discourse of emergency (Honig, 2011) or crisis 
(Grint, 2005), the force of which is the closing down of alternative solutions as insufficient to 
a problem constructed in urgent and over-simplified terms (Winkler, 2007). Leaders can, and 
often do, therefore, actively “interpret” (Widmaier, 2007: 780) events as crises and influence 
public opinion with a framing of an appropriate response. “Times of crises”, according to 
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Bligh et al (2004: 212), in their study of the rhetoric of George W Bush, “enhance the 
likelihood that followers will want to invest increased faith in leaders, see leaders as more 
powerful, and identify more with their leaders as a coping mechanism”.  
Although valuable in making more visible the rhetorical framing employed by leaders, 
particularly in times of perceived crisis to justify their sovereign power, these studies tend to 
assume that the unit of analysis, ‘leadership’, equates to the words and actions of leaders. The 
effect of such an attribution of leadership to the words spoken by leaders may be to naturalise 
the power of leaders (Laclau, 2015: 231-241). A post-foundational analysis, we will now 
argue, enables a view of leadership and sovereign power as inhering in a contingent web of 
language, which may exist prior to and beyond any one individual leader. 
 
A post-foundational approach to analysing sovereign power 
To understand the value of a post-foundational approach, we must firstly and briefly explore 
the contributions of two of the most influential writers on sovereign power, Carl Schmitt and 
Giorgio Agamben. Infamously, Agamben (1998: 123) sees the concentration camp as “the 
hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity”. To understand the basis of this 
assertion we need to track back to the work of Carl Schmitt (1922/2006), later a Nazi jurist, 
who proposed that any act of founding a state seemed to require what we might consider to 
be a distinctly ‘undemocratic’ supplement. This supplement is that of sovereign power, the 
inauguration of a democratic state through the act of a leader who, at that point in time, has 
the required knowledge that will not be possessed by the citizenry. Thus, a contradiction 
exists at the heart of formally democratic states – that they rely upon the undemocratic action 
of a sovereign power for their founding. For Schmitt, this paradox is a kind of natural starting 
place for understanding leadership – all that follows from the sovereign, in the shape of 
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constitutions, democratically elected parliaments, and so on, are a distraction from the 
potential of the exceptional rule of sovereign leaders. Schmitt and Agamben see the tendency 
of states to revert to exception, in particular, during times of perceived crisis, when the norms 
of liberal democracy are suspended in favour of a return to exceptionalism. Agamben’s 
critical reading of exceptionalism is more nuanced than that of Schmitt, positing the 
exception as “a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism” (2005: 
Loc19). For Agamben, the sovereign may act in exceptional ways that could be interpreted as 
outside law (for example, in suspending freedom of speech, or in acts of violence against 
individuals, groups or other states) and yet may also represent a pure ‘force of law’ (ibid: 
Loc529) within an exception, and he has dedicated his career in search of ways in which 
exceptionalism may be resisted and alternative forms of life established. Nevertheless, in 
accepting the founding role of the sovereign, Agamben seems to also accept – or at least 
acknowledge the durability of – an ontology founded upon sovereign power. 
From a post-foundational perspective, Ernesto Laclau (2015) claims that Agamben has been 
too hasty in assuming a foundational status for sovereign power. Laclau states that Agamben 
has confused “origin” with “a determining priority” (p.231), that Agamben “jumps too 
quickly from having established the geneology of a term” (ibid) to its functioning. For 
Laclau, the act of founding signals a range of subsequent possibilities, only one of which 
(exceptionalism) is pursued by Agamben. The act of such a closing down of possibility holds 
two effects for Laclau. The first is that it strips political agency or “any kind of collective 
identity” (ibid) from alternative ways of organizing. The second is an accusation of 
depoliticisation. By this Laclau means that Agamben does not account for political 
contestation, stating that in his work “politics disappears” (p.235). Hence his stinging closing 
retort that “political nihilism is [Agamben’s] ultimate message” (p.241).  
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Laclau’s critique can be understood as partly informed by Foucault’s (1980) suspicion of 
sovereign power and its preference for ‘prohibition’ (ibid: 119) as a disciplinary tactic, which 
he held as less relevant for understanding contemporary, ‘productive’ forms of power. Hence 
his line that “We need to cut off the King’s head” (ibid: 121), meaning that theory needs to 
move beyond the prohibitive power of sovereign leaders, to understand power as a matter of 
governmentality, as something that “circulates…through a net-like organization” (ibid: 98). 
Butler (2006) holds that governmentality and sovereign power are not mutually exclusive, but 
co-dependent and contingent, as recent responses to terror have brought into focus for her 
how sovereign forms of power “assume shape within the field of governmentality, and are 
fundamentally transformed by appearing within that field” (ibid: 66). What she means by this 
is that sovereign power, as expressed through the power to instigate exception, manifests 
within an apparatus of governmentality, of diffuse systems and agents that enforce power 
beyond the law, as is the case with the US government’s use of ‘indefinite detention’ (ibid: 
50) in relation to terror suspects captured abroad. While it is beyond the scope of this study to 
explore the overlaps of sovereign power within diffuse systems of governmentality, it is 
worth highlighting the imbrication of these forms of power in the practices of states as 
important context, and noting the underlying point that sovereign power is contingent upon 
other forms of power and other discursive associations. 
Laclau offers a way of interpreting sovereign power as contingent, postulating that while we 
must ultimately know the world through language, our language is incapable of ever 
capturing ‘fullness’ (Laclau, 2014: 48). This is because language is contingent to its roots: it 
is “contingent all the way down” (Cederström and Spicer, 2014: 179). The signifiers we 
deploy in our articulatory acts are always dependent on other referents, and onwards 
indefinitely. We cannot speak meaningfully of leadership in isolation, therefore, outside its 
dynamic relationship to countless other concepts – followership, charisma, power, and so on - 
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but this system of language never fully closes; it is contested and keeps adapting. Notions 
such as leadership and sovereign power are understood by post-foundationalists as 
constituted through contingent articulations that rely upon an alliance of interests and 
discourses (Laclau, 1990 and 2007; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; see also Connolly, 2005; 
Honig, 2009). Under this interpretation, sovereign power would also need frequent 
affirmation and re-grounding in language, quite plausibly beyond the career or lifetime of any 
one leader or articulator.  
To summarise the review of literature thus far, CLS offers a salient area of research for this 
study, in that it is interested in analysing how meaning and power are exercised through the 
language of leadership. Categorical analyses of leadership do not take for granted the 
presence of leadership but prefer to explore the ways in which the specific word ‘leadership’ 
is used, particularly to enhance and mystify the power of certain people and groups. To date, 
research into leader rhetoric helps us understand some of the rhetorical strategies used to 
construct a case for war but in attributing leadership to the speaking leader – who may or may 
not use that word - risk further naturalising sovereign power. Post-foundational analysis 
offers a way of interpreting leadership and sovereign power as temporary accomplishments, 
needing to be articulated in a contingent web of language. In what follows we outline our 
methodological approach to operationalising these conceptual underpinnings for an analysis 
of Blair’s texts. 
 
Methodology and case description 
Tony Blair became leader of the UK Labour Party in 1994. Blair’s political legacy is 
contested, in domestic and international terms. In foreign policy, Blair was an advocate for 
eliminating poverty and debt in the Global South but was also at the forefront of advocating 
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military action to combat terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq – and later, out of office, 
supported military interventions in Libya and Syria. Blair was chosen as the focus for this 
study because of his centrality in the military coalition posited as a response to terrorism. The 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are notable as symbols of the militaristic strategy in 
relation to terrorism and Blair played a significant role in assembling and supporting the US-
led campaigns. Significantly, however, Blair represented a broad coalition of voters, many of 
whom felt a significant degree of disappointment at the militaristic turn in his premiership, in 
a way that was not matched in the US context, where the president, his advisors and cabinet 
arrived with more ‘hawkish’ expectations and credentials. Militarism was therefore a more 
controversial and contested strategy for Blair, whose rhetoric would have had to do extra 
work to appeal to increasingly hostile voters. Relatedly, Blair, who continues to play a 
prominent role in UK public life, represents an important moment in terms of how people 
relate to the words and actions of public leaders, at least within a UK context: he is a socially 
significant symbol of leadership.  
We chose Blair with the informal foreknowledge that ‘leadership’ was a signifier he often 
used in public appearances. An initial convenience sample of available online speeches 
revealed the prominence of leadership in his talk. Further, an initial literature search indicated 
that leadership was not a topic that had been covered in any depth in relation to Blair. The 
rhetoric of the broader New Labour movement and governments of Blair has been studied, 
notably by Fairclough (2000) and Finlayson (2003), whose work will be drawn upon in the 
analysis. Neither, however, offers an in-depth analysis of the use of ‘leadership’.  
In terms of leadership and Blair, Smolović Jones and Jackson (2015) explore the visual 
dimensions of Blair as a leader, from a Lacanian perspective, but do not interrogate Blair’s 
use of the signifier ‘leadership’. Finalyson and Martin (2008: 457) in their analysis of Blair’s 
final party conference speech as leader, provide some empirical substance as to how he 
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constitutes the task of being a leader, with “personal character [as] the substance of his 
argument”, specifically, “qualities of leadership” such as “self-belief and ‘courage’ rather 
than ‘caution’; a capacity to make unpopular decisions rather than no decisions at all.” The 
primary contribution of the authors, however, is of demonstrating the significance of an 
analysis of a set-piece political speech for insight into ideological, institutional and strategic 
manoeuvrings, rather than upon the narrower focus of better understanding how the word 
leadership is deployed on such occasions.  
Our data set is comprised of a purposive sample of Blair’s speeches, press conferences and 
writing to address the research question, texts that allow for an in-depth analysis of the use of 
leadership within a broader rhetorical context. We accessed the extensive Blair archive at the 
UK People’s History Museum, Manchester, and analysed the 910 documents available, which 
cover the full range of Blair’s leadership of the Labour Party (1994-2007) and supplemented 
the archive with a reading of Blair’s (2010) memoirs. In terms of the museum documents, 
205 of them were from the pre-11 September 2001 period and the remaining 705 from the 
post-11 September 2001 period. They cover large, set-piece conference speeches (party and 
trade union), campaign speeches and articles, speeches to interest groups and public bodies, 
and articles penned for newspapers. These documents varied in length, from longer speeches 
of around 20-30 pages, to tighter ‘doorstep’ statements of a couple of pages. We gave 
primacy to such set-piece events due to their well-established value in illuminating the 
ideological work and strategy at play in the rhetoric of the speaker (e.g. Finlayson, 2003; 
Finlayson and Martin, 2008). Although we could have added further to the sample with 
parliamentary speeches, debates and broadcast interview transcripts, we noted a significant 
degree of saturation having analysed the 910 documents and our sample compared well with 
other studies pursuing similar approaches: e.g. Bligh et al (2004), 516 speeches and media 
sources; Esch (2010), 50 texts; Finlayson (2008), one speech; Maggio (2007), six speeches. 
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Two concepts from post-foundationalism were put to work in analysing the texts: the empty 
signifier and the chain of equivalence. Post-foundationalism introduces the notion of the 
empty signifier as a means of better understanding how some words seem to gain prominence 
and significance in shaping discourse around particular dominant understandings, such as 
tendencies towards sovereign power. Empty signifiers hold a paradoxical status in that they 
buck conventional understanding of the word ‘empty’ because they are affectively salient for 
groups, yet in and of themselves seem to mean little, instead relying on an abundance of 
investment and support from other signifiers, moments and discourses of value to a group: 
they are simultaneously the subject of ‘overdetermination’ and ‘underdetermination’ (Laclau, 
2015: 66); meaning-full but also meaning-light. Empty signifiers hold great affective and 
organizational value for groups, as they are the core around which people make sense of 
things that matter to them; they signify and constitute “an image of a pre-given totality” 
(Laclau, 2007: 162), a totality that is, due to the contingent nature of language, always 
beyond reach. The association of empty signifiers with an (unreachable) ‘totality’, “an 
impossibility of signification as such” (Islam et al, 2017: 4), indicates the significance which 
groups attribute to them. Empty signifiers thus reach beyond utility to signal salient, but 
ultimately unobtainable affective and political commitments (Jones and Spicer, 2005), a 
“compelling utopia” (Kenny and Scriver, 2012: 616). The concept of the empty signifier has 
been drawn upon in organization studies to highlight the cultural salience and ideologically 
loaded constitution, but also vagueness, of the concepts of entrepreneurship (Jones and 
Spicer, 2005; Kenny and Scriver, 2012), mindfulness at work (Islam et al, 2017) and, indeed, 
leadership (Kelly, 2014; Smolović Jones et al, 2016). In terms of leadership as an empty 
signifier in relation to terrorism, such a focus may indicate and organize a certain set of 
available ethical and political responses. However, because leadership is also in and of itself a 
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contingent signifier, it will make apparent the limits of this response: for example, when 
terrorist attacks keep occurring, despite articulations of leadership. 
The second concept of analytical value to this study is that of the chain of equivalence, which 
helps us to understand the associations assembled to pull off an articulation of sovereign 
leadership. The chain of equivalence has been adopted in research to better understand how 
coalitions are articulated, assembled and adapted, such as campaigns opposing airport 
expansion (Griggs and Howarth, 2004 and 2008), or within labour disputes (McLaughlin and 
Bridgman, 2017), offering a deep view of the positive and antagonistic bonds that bind these 
groups discursively. A chain of equivalence simply means the range of discourses and people 
anchored by an empty signifier. They are actively assembled – they are articulated – and do 
not exist independently of our actions (Moon, 2012). In terms of their power effects, chains 
enable a view of power as one articulated between a coalition of interests and actors, rather 
than being something possessed by leaders. Post-foundationalists are thus interested in 
“sedimentations of power” (Marchart, 2007: 139) within (temporary, if often stubbornly 
durable) hegemonic constellations. One important power effect of chains of equivalence lies 
in their very contingency. Because such chains are contingent accomplishments, they are 
always reliant upon an ‘antagonistic’ outside element for their coherence (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 144). Equivalential chains must always “expel or externalise those others to 
which they are opposed” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 165) because their unity depends as 
much upon the construction of a negative ‘other’ as it does upon any positive, internal 
content. We need the bogeyman of the terrorist for our response (assembled through a chain 
of equivalence) to make sense. Nevertheless, due to their foundational contingency, chains 
can be contested, their vulnerabilities exposed – people may develop a different chain of 
association in relation to leadership, sovereign power or terrorism. 
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The data was read in three stages. A first reading was concerned with identifying the empty 
signifiers put to work in Blair’s texts. We discovered a marked turn in Blair’s rhetoric after 
9/11: prior to the attack, his rhetoric was dominated by language without the same 
connotations of sovereign power. The empty signifier of most note in this period is 
‘partnership’, whereas after 9/11, ‘leadership’ was pre-eminent. A total of 423 references to 
leadership were identified in the latter, post-11 September period of Blair’s leadership, with 
only 43 found in the earlier period. We bracketed off each section of the documents where 
leadership was used, to read this signifier in the context of the broader rhetorical point made 
within the text.  
A second reading was concerned with exploring the status of leadership as an empty signifier 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 29). We read the documents iteratively, asking whether and 
how leadership was deployed as an empty signifier: whether it was being used as a node, 
bringing together other discourses in a coherent form of meaningful argumentation. Through 
such a strategy we identified three moments at work: emergency, positivity and vulnerability. 
These moments were interleaving in the texts and separating them out for neat presentation in 
a paper is perhaps a necessarily synthetic dissociation, something which will be elaborated 
upon in the discussion. Also of particular note was the way in which morality (through 
informal theorisations of moral leadership; establishing what it means to be a moral leader; 
equating morality with being a normal person) seemed to weave in association with all of the 
moments. 
We performed a third reading, a close textual analysis drawing on post-foundational 
discourse analysis (Cederström and Spicer, 2014; Griggs and Howarth, 2004 and 2008; 
Howarth, 2013; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Moon, 2012). Our analysis focused on the 
empty signifier within its textual context (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002) and proceeded in 
three further stages. First, we explored what was placed in a chain of equivalence with the 
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empty signifier, “the linking together of signifiers in chains of equivalence” (Jørgensen and 
Phillips, 2002: 42). Identifying the moments and signifiers assembled around the empty 
signifier allows a reading of the affective force lent to an articulation (Cederström and Spicer, 
2014: 191). Second, we explored who was included in the chain of equivalence, the people 
pointed to by Blair as sharing common cause (Laclau, 2007). Furthermore, focusing on who 
was included in a chain enabled an analysis of those who were excluded by the articulation, 
actors constructed as antagonistic, on the other side of the ‘political frontier’ proffered by the 
articulator (Griggs and Howarth, 2008: 129). Third, we focused on points of fragility, and 
hence also contestation, in the texts (Cederström and Spicer, 2014; Howarth, 2013; Kelly, 
2014), as a means of identifying limits to the articulatory logic presented. Such points can be 
indicated by pauses or half-completed sentences (Smolović Jones et al, 2016). A focus on 
fragility also entailed exploring the non-meaning of articulated signifiers, instances where the 
meaning might be understood tacitly, by inference.  
 
Data analysis 
In what follows we introduce our three moments in the articulation of leadership by Blair, 
which, when placed together, weave a tapestry that seeks to make sovereign power 
understandable, sensible and desirable, and draws in more depth on the twin concepts of the 
empty signifier and chain of equivalence. The first moment, ‘emergency’, involves a 
generation of urgency that simplifies the problem of terrorism and offers straightforward 
moral leadership as the solution. The second, ‘positivity’, articulates leadership as a purely 
favourable category, which contrasts positive moral leadership with an ‘outside’ that is 
posited as threatening and immoral. The third, ‘vulnerability’, invites empathy with the 
‘normal’ and moral person of the leader, conveying the sense of a subject who struggles 
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through adversity, emerging with a stronger faith in the necessity of sovereign leadership. We 
refer to the rhetorical tactic of transiting between vulnerability and foreclosed sovereign 
leadership as one of ‘expose and close’. 
 
Emergency 
Leadership becomes prominent in Blair’s texts after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. 
The posited crisis of the attacks acts as a gateway to several moral positions associated by 
Blair with terrorism, adding an affective and ethical force to the empty signifier of leadership 
as a justification for war. As a response to emergency, supporting signifiers and actors are 
called forth in a chain of equivalence to indicate points where a premium value is placed 
upon moral certainty and simplicity, both adopted as justifications for sovereign exercises of 
power.  
A range of signifiers are deployed, signalling the affective weight of moral certainty: 
courage, steadfastness and decisiveness. Next to the adjectival support for leadership are 
actors deployed as embodying moral leadership: chiefly those who seem most supportive of 
military action. Furthermore, a construction of a decent and understanding British public is 
posited, a construction of a people prepared, ultimately, to cede to the sovereign judgment of 
the leader. Emergency is thus a foreclosing moment within sovereign leadership, a means of 
closing off dissent, contest and alternative ethical positions.  
Blair, perhaps seeking to make sense of his passage to war, in a speech made a year into the 
Iraq invasion, said that “September 11 was…a revelation. What had seemed inchoate came 
together…From September 11th on I could see the threat plainly. Here were terrorists 
prepared to bring about Armageddon” (Speech on security, 05/03/2004). The attacks of 
September 11 signal in Blair’s texts a hardening of his moral position regarding military 
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intervention but also a more general commitment to acting according to his own ethical 
judgments, removed from the perceived excess noise of media voices and alternative 
opinions. His explicit use of crisis rhetoric ('Armageddon' in this instance), signals an 
urgency to his proposed moral framing of leadership. 
This notion of moral conviction as a response to emergency is a significant feature of Blair’s 
leadership-related language throughout his post-9/11 years in power. In his 2003 speech to 
Labour Party conference, seven months into the Iraq invasion, Blair proclaimed that he had 
no “reverse gear”: a signal that his exercise of power was to become bolder, more urgent. 
Variations of this refrain returned throughout his premiership, for example his statement that 
“standing still means falling back” (speech on an interdependent world, 18/01/2007), 
delivered after he had made it known that he would not serve beyond September that year as 
PM; or in a speech on security (05/03/2004), at a time when armed resistance in Iraq had 
started to increase: “Prime ministers don’t have the luxury of maintaining both sides of the 
argument. They can see both sides. But, ultimately, leadership is about deciding.” 
It is worth contextualising the ‘no reverse gear’ trope in more depth. Taken in context, one 
discovers that it sits within a narrative on leadership, where an ever more urgent response to 
crisis is offered as solution: 
It [choices facing Labour in a time of crisis] was about leadership. Get rid of the false 
choice: principles or no principles. Replace it with the true choice. Forward or back. I 
can only go one way. I've not got a reverse gear…I know it's hard for people to keep 
faith…I trust their decency. I trust their innate good sense…I've never led this party 
by calculation. Policy you calculate. Leadership comes by instinct. I believe the 
British people will forgive a government mistakes…but what they won't forgive is 
cowardice in the face of a challenge. 
	 20	
The effect in this extract is a normalising of the sovereign power of leaders, drawing on 
emergency and morality as the catalyst: the willingness to exercise power is portrayed as a 
desirable leadership trait and the proof of its desirability is to be found in the ‘good sense’ of 
people to support it. Within the text, the shift is from calculation to the empty signifier of 
leadership, through which Blair articulates his moral position. Note that leadership in the face 
of terrorism is ‘true’, and because it is ‘true’ there is no requirement for a ‘reverse gear’ – 
because being ‘true’ cannot be wrong. At the heart of this leadership is courage, or at least 
not being driven by ‘cowardice’. A value system of ‘decency’, ‘common sense’ and 
‘forgiveness’ is enrolled in support of his ‘forwards’ leadership theorisation, with British 
people constructed as embodying these traits. Blair returns repeatedly in his texts to a 
construction of a chain of equivalence, where a ‘people’ are enrolled as “tolerant and decent”, 
who believe in “fairness and decency” and who will ultimately forgive decisive and morally 
certain leaders “whatever the difficulties and disagreements” (speech outside Downing Street, 
06/05/2005, the day after the general election).  
Bolstering the drive for leadership in Blair’s texts are certain moral commitments, which 
connect with the empty signifier of leadership and provide the ethical underpinning for 
exercises of sovereign power. These are freedom, justice and democracy, primarily: 
Any leadership…should be based on values. And these values – democracy, freedom, 
the rule of law – again I believe passionately…they are the universal values of the 
human spirit. (speech to the East-West Institute, 08/12/2005, five months into his final 
term as PM). 
There is a twofold irony at play here. First is the notion of the sovereign power of leaders 
evoked as a means of safeguarding democracy: the paradox of founding manifested in text. 
The second irony is that the values drawn upon as the basis of leadership (a contested concept 
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and empty signifier) as a response to terrorism (another contested concept) are in themselves 
concepts that have been claimed as highly contestable empty signifiers – e.g. there are many 
interpretations of what it means to truly embody and practice democracy (see Laclau, 2014). 
Through the moment of emergency, the articulation of a chain of equivalence (achieved 
through the construction of a ‘people’), meets the positing of leadership in empty if affective 
and moral terms to make a case for sovereign power. The overall effect is one of foreclosure 
and taming (Grint, 2005), of paring down complexity into a binary choice of forwards or 
backwards. Leadership thus represents decisiveness in the face of urgent difficulty; of 
recognising that people are prepared to accept an exercise of sovereign power. The next 
section expands on what Blair means by leadership, further substantiating its connection to 
sovereign power through equating leadership with a purely positive set of personality 
characteristics Blair deems as possessed by sovereign leaders. 
 
Positivity 
This section explores instances of the deployment of leadership in purely positive terms 
(Collinson, 2012; Fineman, 2006). No space is left within this presentation of leadership for 
the negative, for the possibility that some forms of leadership could be considered poor; 
leadership is, rather, presented as a positive character attribute, with exemplar leaders offered 
as role models possessing a positive morality. Blair does not provide a substantive case while 
inviting us to admire certain leaders; rather, their status as ‘good leaders’ is assumed, 
underlining the emptiness of the category of leadership, yet also highlighting the significance 
of the signifier, as Blair draws on sensual modes of positive appreciation. Such a presentation 
of positive leadership could be read as sharing elements of ‘seductive manipulation’ 
(Auvinen et al, 2013) in the sense that Blair portrays leaders with controversial and contested 
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reputations in purely positive terms. As a counter-point to this positive presentation of the 
necessary attributes of allied leaders, Blair presents an antagonistic terrorist other, essential 
for the creation and maintenance of a chain of equivalence, both abstract and manifest in a 
few individuals (Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, primarily). Similarly to the positive 
portrayal of leaders, this presentation of ‘the other’ is univocal, although this time instead of a 
vague aura of positivity, we are presented with a menacing force to be defeated through 
sovereign leadership. The effect of this binary is the closing off of opportunities to learn from 
the negative and from failures – both in terms of how one views elected leaders and their 
actions and in terms of how one understands and constructs terrorism (Collinson, 2012).  
The individual leaders who qualify as embodying leadership are those prepared to sacrifice 
their own popularity for a certain moral consistency. President Aznar of Spain’s leadership is 
praised in the weeks before the invasion of Iraq (press conference, 28/02/2003) as 
demonstrating “courage”. Likewise, Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai is commended for 
his “courage and [his] leadership” (press conference, 29/06/2004), at a time when violence in 
Iraq and Afghanistan had intensified. Australia PM John Howard’s leadership is referenced 
as “steadfast”, eight months into the invasion of Iraq (interview, 11/11/2003) and, later, as 
violence in Iraq continued but elections in the country had taken place, as “firm” (speech on 
globalisation, 27/03/2006).  
It is George Bush, however, who is most associated with leadership in Blair’s texts. Courage 
is again a dominant theme (e.g. press conference, 06/04/2002, 11 months prior to the Iraq 
invasion and during the Afghanistan war) but his leadership is also characterised by 
“tremendous conviction, determination” in the early stages of the Iraq invasion (press 
conference, 27/07/2003). It is supportive leaders who qualify as possessing leadership, with 
no room made available in his lexicon for a negative form of leadership. What constitutes 
leadership in others appears as a commitment to a form of reliability and stamina 
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(steadfastness and determination) and bravery (courage and conviction in the face of hostile 
protest, acts of terror and negative media coverage) - but only if they are allies.  
Elsewhere, Blair proffers leaders he holds as admirable but offers no substantive supporting 
signifiers to enable the listener or reader to clarify what is meant by leadership. These 
instances are significant because they point to an assumed understanding of leadership. In his 
memoirs, Blair (2010) recounts his first encounter with the then mayor of New York, Rudy 
Giuliani, as a moment where he seemed to instantly feel the mayor’s leadership: 
I liked him instantly. He was under immense pressure but he seemed to be not only 
coping, but stepping forward and giving a strong sense of leadership (Loc 8014). 
Leadership is something possessed by Giuliani and ‘given’ to those around him, although not 
in any way that could be made sense of analytically. Here the empty signifier of leadership 
seems to only be perceptible through the senses, as if it were a series of sounds, odours and 
presences. 
Bush is often referenced by his (unexplained) leadership. In a speech to US Congress 
(18/07/2003), in the early stages of the Iraq invasion, for example, Blair expresses his 
“gratitude to President Bush. Through the troubled times since September 11 changed the 
world, we have been allies and friends. Thank you, Mr President, for your leadership.” The 
qualification for leadership here appears to be friendship and the status of an ally. Assumed 
leadership conveys a further closing of meaning made in connection to those who favour 
decisive acts of sovereign power.  
Posed against this positive account of leadership is an antagonistic outside aggressor, an 
antithesis of leadership, the figure of the terrorist and the phenomenon of terrorism. As the 
presentation of positive leadership held a vague and often unsubstantiated aura of strength, 
terrorists and terrorism are portrayed by Blair as opaque and ubiquitous, a menacing and 
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metaphysical presence (Eagleton, 2005) who provide an antagonistic justification within the 
logic of the chain of equivalence for sovereign leadership. Terrorists, dictators and religious 
extremists are represented by “shadow and darkness” (speech to US Congress, 18/07/2003). 
Hence terror is “an assault on our hearts and minds. It represents extremism, cruelty, 
intolerance of different cultures and lifestyles. It can’t be fought just with guns. It must be 
fought by tolerance triumphing over bigotry” (speech at the George Bush Snr Presidential 
Library, 07/04/2002, made at a time when it was thought that Blair was seeking to influence 
the Bush administration, during Afghanistan but prior to the Iraq invasion). Opaque 
categories of ‘others’ are, according to Laclau (2007), vital in constituting and maintaining a 
chain of equivalence, as they provide a target against which the chain may be mobilised, but 
the imprecision of the target also ensures the continuation of the chain, as a “shadow” can 
never be finally eliminated. Allied to terror, however, are its occasional but specific 
manifestations, a definite enemy capable of defeat: such as Saddam, who, when he is granted 
agency, is “detestable”, “brutal” and “repressive” (article on the Middle East, 10/04/2002, 
published 11 months before the invasion), but also cunning and manipulative: 
To anyone familiar with Saddam's tactics of deception and evasion, there is a weary 
sense of déjà vu…The concessions are suspect. Unfortunately the weapons are real 
(Speech to Labour spring conference, 17/02/03, made weeks before the invasion). 
In this extract the weaving of fabrication by an aggressor (Saddam) is counterposed with a 
‘real’ target (weapons of mass destruction) capable of elimination through sovereign 
leadership (this is a speech themed around leadership). 
Leadership is thus presented as a vague yet positive character attribute in counterpoint to a 
vague yet highly negative aggressor, rather than a practice containing scope for learning from 
good, bad and contested results (Collinson, 2012; Fineman, 2006). Yet such a positive 
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presentation of leadership might seem somewhat underwhelming and unconvincing in 
isolation, as the leaders cited by Blair – and Blair himself - were at least viewed by people at 
the time in mixed terms and it seems unlikely that equating these leaders as synonymous with 
a positive account of leadership, even in contrast with an obvious aggressor, would be 
sufficiently persuasive. The next section therefore analyses attempts by Blair to soften the 
figure of the sovereign leader, seeking to draw the listener in to an empathetic appreciation of 
the difficulties such leaders face.  
 
Vulnerability 
Moments of vulnerability and leadership are strongly connected in Blair’s rhetoric to self-
portrayals of ‘normalness’ (Fairclough, 2000: 99), “a relaxed, firmly anchored and well-
adjusted personality in a generally rather sordid political world” (ibid). Again, the notion of a 
‘well-adjusted personality’ calls forth associations of personal morality, which may take 
frequent blows from external sources but nevertheless perseveres. The sovereign leadership 
articulated by Blair emerges all the stronger for having acknowledged the vulnerability of the 
sovereign leader: a rhetorical tactic we refer to as ‘expose and close’. It is possible to 
interpret ‘vulnerable’ moments associated with leadership as sharing some discursive 
similarities with a ‘pseudo-empathetic’ (Auvinen et al, 2013) form of manipulation, seeking 
to soften and humanise the harder face of sovereign power, signalling to listeners that he is 
feeling, imperfect and fragile, just like them, but despite this prepared to fulfil the ‘self-
sacrificial’ role of the leader (Grint, 2010; Śliwa et al, 2012) in exchange for his sovereign 
power. Or, of course, it is perfectly possible to read moments of vulnerable leadership as 
articulations of genuine discomfort, ambivalence and uncertainty experienced by a subject 
placed within a contingent network of discursive assumptions about what leaders can do and 
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provide, substantively and emotionally, in times of perceived emergency. Regardless of the 
emphasis of interpretation, the end effect is the same: the foreclosure of doubt after a display 
of vulnerability.  
In response to the mass protests in London against the invasion of Iraq, in a speech entitled 
‘Unpopularity is the price of leadership’ (Speech to Labour spring conference, 17/02/03), 
Blair explicitly ties together leadership with notions of vulnerability and empathy: 
There will be no march for the victims of Saddam, no protests about the thousands of 
children who die needlessly every year under his rule…But I ask the marchers to 
understand this: I do not seek unpopularity as a badge of honour. But sometimes it is 
the price of leadership.  
In this extract Iraqi children, unable to speak for themselves, are enrolled in a chain of 
equivalence that invites the listener to feel the same empathy for them as Blair does. 
Portrayed together with children in this chain of equivalence is Blair himself, who is willing 
to sacrifice ‘popularity’ for a greater cause, because experiencing electoral vulnerability is 
“the price of leadership”. We see the movement of expose and close in the foreclosing 
resolution of this passage – of the need for ‘leadership’ in spite of – and because of – personal 
hardships. In fact Blair often equates popularity as being in an inverse relationship with 
offering leadership, interpreting his electoral victory in 2005, a diminished if decisive win, as 
offering a “bitter irony” (Blair, 2010: 584), “feel[ing] absolutely at the height of my ability 
…when my popularity was at its lowest…I had won, not lost…there was a residual respect 
for and attachment to strong and decisive leadership”. 
However, it is in his final speech to his party’s conference (26/09/2003) that vulnerability and 
the movement of expose and close is displayed most dramatically. The following extract was 
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not contained in the initial draft of the speech and is not accessible in media reproductions. It 
is an off-script passage, a deviation from his original point, which followed directly from a 
passage on the uncertainties of leadership in relation to war and terrorism: 
The most common phrase uttered to me…[pause] is not ‘I hate you’ (well, 
occasionally), or ‘I like you’ (very occasionally)…but actually is ‘I wouldn't have 
your job for all the world.’  
Even when my two boys were canvassing in the last general election, we were going 
down a street and my boy Nicky went and [pause] and knocked on the door; asked 
him to vote Labour. A volley of abuse…And anyway [pause] here's brotherly love for 
you…And he says, ‘Euan, there's a bloke over at number 14. He's mad [pause] at 
dad.’ I think [pause] but anyway, he says [pause] knock on the door. And says to the 
bloke…’Could you [pause]’ An even worse volley of abuse. And he sees him there 
looking a bit sort of fragile under it all and he says, ‘What's wrong, then?’ And Euan 
says, ‘Well, actually, you know, Blair is my dad.’ And the bloke says, ‘Look, I'm 
really sorry, son. Come in and have a cup of tea. I didn't really mean all that.’ 
And that [pause] that is what the British people are like. They're [pause]…They're 
good people. You know, they [pause] they [pause] they know it took [pause] The 
thing about leadership is they know it's tough. 
The passage represents a movement between vulnerability and foreclosure, of an expose and 
close cohering around the signifier of leadership. It begins with Blair staking his preparedness 
to assume the ‘self-sacrificing’ (Śliwa et al, 2012) role of the leader, seeking to draw listeners 
in to an account of subjection to ‘hate’ from an antagonistic outsider and the difficulty of his 
job. Here, a familial act of love seems to foreclose dissent. Cracks and openings in the 
rhetoric remain, however, signalled through pauses and uncertainties, as Blair struggles to 
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collect his thoughts, signalling a limit in his symbolic identifications with sovereign 
leadership. The section seems to end, however, with a foreclosing section, an affirmation of 
the British people’s ‘goodness’: a return of the moral as a counter-weight to uncertainty.  
On the face of things, vulnerability acts as a plea for empathy, as Blair is portrayed as a 
normal person – publicly affirming the contingency of leaders and leadership. Yet a closer 
analysis reveals a subtle interplay between vulnerability and foreclosure, of expose and close, 
with examples of ‘normal’ human weakness interspersed with textual foreclosure, as if 
sovereign leadership must pass through trials of strength to emerge as more ‘strong and 
decisive’. The logic of contingency is thus flipped on its head and drawn upon as further 
proof of the importance of sovereign leadership. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
We have sought to uncover a system of foreclosing moments within Blair’s discursive chains, 
cohering upon the empty signifier of leadership and constructed through chains of 
equivalence, which knit together contingent but affectively and morally loaded moments that 
push towards sovereign power as the solution to terrorism. We called such an imbrication of 
the empty signifier leadership and the discourse of sovereign power, ‘sovereign leadership’. 
We will now consider our contribution in relation to the three moments highlighted in the 
data, before moving on to reflect on some of the broader implications of our work. 
First, sovereign leadership was achieved through aligning the empty signifier of leadership 
with moments of emergency. Grint’s (2005) account of the relationship between crisis and 
command, as well as the contribution of war rhetoric studies (e.g. Honig, 2011; Maggio, 
2007), draw attention to the fact that leaders often heighten a sense of emergency through 
language, facilitating hierarchical command solutions to problems. We show how such 
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constructions of emergency are pieced together via chains of equivalence, but we also draw 
attention to their heavy moral overtones. Such a presentation underlines that emergency 
moments not only seek to heighten anxiety and urgency but also make a case that sovereign 
responses are morally just ones. The irony of this presentation lies, however, in the point that 
the moral presuppositions made were in themselves contingent, even empty – democracy, 
freedom and the rule of law are all contested and contingent signifiers. Likewise, the target 
upon which sovereign leadership was directed, terrorism, is also well established as a 
contested and contingent term (e.g. Fisk, 2001: 438-441). In contrast to Agamben’s (1998 
and 2005) reading of sovereign power, our case is that, although the moment of emergency 
seeks to foreclose meaning, as these are contingent and co-dependent articulations of 
sovereign leadership, they are also more susceptible to being scrutinized, unpicked and 
challenged. 
The second moment showed how meaning was foreclosed around sovereign leadership by 
equating it to a positive and moral attribute – those who oppose are simply labelled as 
something else: misplaced, eccentric, intolerant or terroristic, and expelled outside the chain 
of equivalence as antagonists. Within CLS, a tendency towards excess positivity has been 
highlighted by Collinson (2012) in relation to the decision to invade Iraq and the subsequent 
resignation of the cabinet minister, Clare Short, who complained of the silencing of 
dissenting voices within government. The broader implication of the work of Collinson 
(ibid), and of Fineman (2006), is that excess positivity creates an environment, indeed, a 
seductive narrative (Auvinen et al, 2013), that restricts learning from negative experiences 
and failure. A key finding of our paper is that we may take insight into excess positivity in 
relation to leadership a stage further and connect it explicitly to the generation of shadowy 
‘others’ in leadership talk, who are articulated in this study via chains of equivalence. These 
antagonistic others – terrorists, the threat of terrorism, the media, opponents of war, 
	 30	
protestors - are primarily opaque and dynamic presences who serve the function of justifying 
the need for sovereign leadership. Yet without the presence of excess positivity, the need for 
these figures would appear compromised at best, as the signifying system around leadership 
would contain within it more capacity for critical self-reflection and learning. Positivity and 
antagonistic others are co-constitutive of the kind of leadership constructed, as if the 
uncertainties, unspoken dark spots and doubts concerning militarism and sovereign power are 
packaged up and placed onto the figure of the unreasonable or dangerous ‘other’. While the 
construction of ‘others’ in a co-dependent relation to positivity may serve a function of 
foreclosure, it also, ipso facto, reveals the contingent nature of the construction of leadership, 
which is dependent upon an external, and usually imprecise, supplement, for its coherence 
and persuasive force. Future research might explore whether such constitutive ‘othering’ 
manifests in other contexts, outside the formal political arena. To date CLS has largely 
overlooked the role of the ‘other’ in constituting leadership discursively, perhaps because to 
do so entails exploring the ultra-dark recesses of organizations and language, of 
marginalization and violence, or, more provocatively, entails disrupting and challenging the 
value of the broader leadership industry. 
The third moment of ‘vulnerability’ showed how Blair sought to position himself as a 
‘normal’ (Fairclough, 2000) person, within a system of contingent identifications, where all 
‘decent’ people are assumed to be flawed and incomplete. This was a foreclosing moment, as 
vulnerability was drawn upon as a kind of rite of passage that demonstrated strength in and 
through vulnerability, as the sovereign emerged on the other side emboldened by his moral 
commitments and judgment. Studies of the war rhetoric of leaders have focused on aspects of 
leader presentation that emphasise strength in the face of crisis: the ‘commanding’ (Grint, 
2005), ‘savage’ (Ivie, 1980), ‘civilising’ (Esch, 2010) and ‘charismatic’ (Bligh et al, 2004) 
aspects of leaders’ talk. Yet our study raises the possibility that weakness – or at least the 
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willingness to communicate a less than perfect façade – seems significant. We can connect 
vulnerability to the findings of Grint (2010) and Śliwa et al (2012), who both highlight the 
salience of self-sacrifice in the discourse relating to heroic leaders, and also to the notion of 
‘pseudo-empathy’ (Auvinen et al, 2013) as a manipulative act. Our study contributes by 
drawing attention to the tactic of expose and close. The tactic heightens a leader’s vulnerable 
position within a contingent system, only to posit such vulnerability, the leader’s willingness 
for self-sacrifice and the ability to survive attack, as a further qualification for sovereign 
leadership. We also contribute here by highlighting how notions of self-sacrifice, via 
vulnerability, are assembled within chains of equivalence that position the leader in relation 
to other ‘normal’ people. Yet we also show how such moments of vulnerability and 
willingness to self-sacrifice again contain a dark side, a positing of an antagonistic ‘other’, 
without whom the leader could not appear as normal or moral in the first place.  
As previously noted, separating out these moments in some ways is a synthetic exercise, as in 
practice they seem to overlap, coming together to foreclose meaning around sovereign 
leadership. It is difficult to envisage any contemporary pull towards sovereign leadership 
being as compelling without the presence of all three: convincing people of the need for a 
strong and decisive moral leader without an obvious antagonist and the threat of emergency 
seems implausible. In particular, in an era of post-deference towards leaders, at least in the 
context of liberal democracies, displays of self-depreciating vulnerability – acknowledging 
contingency but also, through that very contingency, transcending it - might be particularly 
important in building a case for sovereign leadership. We might also note the fact that each of 
these moments are in themselves somewhat ‘empty’. They are salient but flexible moments 
that might carry a quite different connotation under alternative circumstances. The relative 
emptiness of the moments presented, as well as the notion of sovereign leadership itself, 
points to their contingency and thus also, in theory, to the possibility that each of these 
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contingent connections could have been otherwise articulated and received. Such a reading 
stands in contrast to the more “determining priority” (2015: 231) given to sovereign power by 
Agamben’s (1998 and 2005) genealogy and to the tacit assumption in studies of leader 
rhetoric that the speech of leaders equates to leadership. 
In terms of our primary contribution, in the area of CLS more generally, we hold that the 
concept of sovereign leadership could be an important, yet overlooked, explanation of the 
preference for ‘strong’ individuals in the broader leadership literature and, indeed, in 
organizational and political life. Our study shares in common with the work of Śliwa et al 
(2012) and Grint (2010), a concern for highlighting the cultural familiarity and appeal, the 
‘sacredness’, of investing in the sovereign leader as the source of a group or society’s 
problems and solutions, but differs in that it moves beyond the figure of the leader to make 
more visible the system of language that constitutes such sacralization. An underlying 
assumption of the value of our research is that systems of language pre-date and live on after 
a leader has left office, a point we regard as significant given that terrorist attacks continue 
but the political leaders charged with addressing them change. While the analysis can never 
be entirely divorced from the articulating individual, we see great value for CLS in exploring 
more specifically and systemically uses of the signifier of leadership, how it is used to 
foreclose but also, perhaps, to open up critique and dialogue.  
The connection we have made between sovereign power and leadership, and the conceptual 
and methodological approach we have adopted for their analysis, we believe holds potential 
for understanding how leadership is articulated and circulates in organizations and political 
life beyond the specific utterances of an individual leader. After all, the call for ‘strong 
leadership’ is familiar, across political and organizational contexts and it usually comes 
packaged with foreclosing tendencies. For example, in the UK political context, Conservative 
PM Theresa May fought the 2017 general election campaign on the premise of ‘strong and 
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stable leadership’. This was a mantra that was accompanied by minimising questioning from 
journalists and voters. The signifier of leadership seemed to be once more deployed as a 
mechanism of foreclosure, a culturally loaded signal sent out to voters that the leader ought to 
be able to exercise sovereign power in a time of uncertainty and crisis, this time the UK’s 
withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Such a commonplace association of leadership 
with sovereign power is not simply something pulled off by leaders themselves but by a 
broader web of actors – amongst followers and the media. In a recent edition of the BBC’s 
political panel discussion programme, Question Time, for example, the solution of three 
separate (white male) audience members to the impasse and complexity of the UK’s 
negotiations over withdrawal from the EU was ‘a strong leader’ or ‘strong leadership’, with 
the details of what such leaders or leadership might accomplish left unspecified (BBC, 2018). 
Although a more dispersed analysis of sovereign leadership is beyond the scope of this paper, 
future research might explore how notions of leadership and sovereign power are entangled 
and manifest amongst groups in their everyday practices. Relatedly, we also note that the 
focus of our research on language overlooked a more embodied account of the relationship 
between sovereign power and leadership. In terms of both of these alternative foci, 
considerable scope exists for exploring the material, gendered and racialized connotations of 
sovereign leadership, deferring as such constructions usually do to a particular type of 
privileged white masculinity – although, as noted with reference to Theresa May, being a 
man need not be a prerequisite for adopting and communicating sovereign leadership.  
Remaining within the bounds of our broader CLS contribution, making the system of 
language surrounding sovereign leadership more visible, and moving the focus away from the 
figure of the leader, holds potential for better understanding the dynamics of resistance 
leadership (Zoller and Fairhurst, 2007). The key facet of a post-foundational understanding of 
sovereign power is its focus on the contingency, and therefore inherent contestability, of that 
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power, allowing for the possibility that with a more nuanced view of the system of language 
surrounding sovereign leadership, researchers seeking to theorise resistance leadership – and 
indeed resisting groups in practice - could be better positioned to offer alternative 
articulations. After all, if we can identify and map the language of sovereign leadership, its 
complicated weaving of moments, performed through the deployment of empty signifiers and 
chains of equivalence, we can also begin to patiently unpick and challenge these articulations. 
One way in which our research might contribute to a better understanding of resistance 
leadership is in its differentiation between leader and leadership as a signifier, which in turn 
allows a differentiation to be drawn between resisting a sovereign leader and resisting 
sovereign leadership, as practice and discourse. While some resisting groups may 
successfully resist individual sovereign leaders, they may yet perpetuate sovereign leadership 
through adopting some or all of its discursive and practice characteristics (Collinson et al, 
2017).  
In terms of our secondary contribution, in the broader area of post-foundational research, we 
note that post-foundational approaches to sovereign power have remained conceptual in 
nature and separated from the rich body of work within CLS. While post-foundational 
thought has provided a theoretical lens through which to interpret the ontological contingency 
of the very notion of sovereign power, and concepts that can be put to work in analysing 
articulations of sovereign power, it has yet to explore and refine these propositions in a 
contextually rich manner, drawing on insights from contemporary critical leadership theory. 
In particular, we suggest that there is a gap present between the theorising of sovereign power 
as an ‘uncertain circulation’ (Connolly, 2005: 141), and a more stubborn empirical 
experience where organizations and groups seem to revert to sovereignty. Approaching 
sovereign power via various foreclosing moments may help enrich further studies and 
contribute to better understanding how, despite its contingent foundations, it manages to 
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persevere as a dominant discourse in political and organizational life, as well as pointing to 
ways in which alternative signifiers and contingencies can be established.  
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